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abstract
Principles of human rights rest at the heart of social justice and notions 
of an inclusive society. This article seeks to refocus practice attention on 
the issue of human rights and the ways in which rights-based ideas can 
be integrated across practice, policy and legal domains. It argues that 
creating systems in which critical components mutually reinforce rights-
based ideas will be more likely to have the depth of influence required 
to shift thinking toward rights-based practice and maintain its endurance 
over time.  
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introduction
The past decade has seen a surge of popular and academic interest in the 
subject of human rights (Churchill, 2006; Donnelly, 2003; Dunn & Wheeler, 
1999; Gewirth, 1998; Li, 2006; Nickel, 2007; Orend, 2002). On a daily basis 
we see media reports on human rights and their violations. Nations 
have become galvanised by the idea of human rights and are prepared 
to monitor its abuses and to intervene to stop violations elsewhere. 
Therefore, the claim that every human being has intrinsic value has 
ignited the international political community. The topic of human rights 
has become a moral cause, and declarations such as the United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1984) and the 
two associated United Nations covenants are increasingly utilised in 
the evaluation of international and national laws and political processes 
(Donnelly, 2003; Orend, 2002).
Law and policy provide an environment within which ideas and beliefs 
are sanctioned and supported in practice. They provide the overarching 
mission and goals for human services (Pecora, Whittaker & Maluccio, 
2006) and they can provide the impetus for innovative change and 
development. In this article, we will consider the role policy and law can 
play in furthering rights-based practice. We also consider some of the 
challenges involved in shifting practitioners toward a focus on human 
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rights. We then discuss opportunities to create an 
integrated framework to support rights-based ideas 
in practice and to support good outcomes for clients. 
rights and rEsponsibilitiEs: thE 
rolE of thE statE
Human rights are designed to protect human 
dignity (Waldron, 2009). The concept of human 
dignity is an old ethical idea that has at its centre the 
claim that every human being has intrinsic worth 
and is equal in this respect (Sulmasy, 2007).  Initially, 
it was accepted that individuals’ level of dignity 
varied according to their social status, with peasants 
considered inferior to nobles or clergy. However, 
with the event of modern liberal thought in the 17th 
century, a sea change in meaning was discernible. 
Rather than high value being exclusively associated 
with individuals of elevated social rank, all human 
beings were regarded as if they were aristocrats 
or royalty. This shift in the meaning of the term 
dignityin modern times and its close link with the 
concept of rights is nicely expressed by Waldron 
(2009, p.2):
Dignity, we are told, was once tied up with 
rank: the dignity of a king was not the same 
as the dignity of bishop and neither of them 
was the same as the dignity of a professor. 
If our modern conception of human dignity 
retains any scintilla of its ancient and historical 
connection with rank- and I think it does: I 
think it expresses the idea of the high and 
equal rank of every human person- ...Dignity 
is intimately connected with the idea of rights 
as the ground of rights, and the content of 
certain rights, and perhaps even the form and 
structural character of rights.
Because of their inherent dignity, human beings 
are assumed to possess equal moral status and are, 
therefore, expected to receive due consideration in 
matters that directly affect their core interests.  If 
we all matter equally, it is incumbent on each of us 
to think about how our actions are likely to affect 
the people around us, both close and distant. The 
possibility of their experiencing unjustified harm 
as a consequence of our actions should function 
as a red flag and prompt us to reflect on how or 
if we should proceed with our planned course of 
action (Driver, 2006).  Furthermore, the equal moral 
standing of each person within a community means 
that every person is entitled to make specific claims 
against other members of the moral community 
and, in turn, is expected to acknowledge his or her 
obligations to others’ respective legitimate claims. 
These claims will concern the goods they are entitled 
to as members of the community, especially ones 
that are regarded as essential for securing their core 
interests and needs. 
A human right is a claim right held by individuals 
in virtue of the fact that they are human beings 
and, as stated above, reflect human dignity (Griffin, 
2008). Human rights are not tied to a particular 
social class, professional group, cultural collective, 
racial group, gender or any other exclusive category. 
Individuals hold human rights simply because they 
are members of the human race and, as such, are 
considered to be entitled to a life characterised by 
a certain level of dignity. Such a life ultimately is 
based on the capacity and opportunity to form a 
conception of a worthwhile life and the chance to 
realise this conception without undue opposition 
from other people. 
The dignity of human life is thought by rights theorists 
to reside in individuals’ ability to make fundamental 
life choices for themselves and the satisfaction of 
basic human needs enabling them to live at least 
minimally worthwhile lives. In order to do this, it is 
necessary that certain wellbeing and freedom goods 
are available to people (Gewirth, 1998; Griffin, 2008; 
Miller, 2007). According to theorists, human rights 
are grounded by reference to personhood or need 
considerations rather than moral facts or truths 
that are evident within the fabric of the world 
(Gewirth, 1996; Griffin, 2008). What they mean by 
this is that the concept of agency and the capacity 
and opportunities to form and pursue important life 
goals (with a reasonable chance of success) depend 
on individuals’ ability to evaluate their goals and 
conception of a good life and formulate a plan to 
achieve them. It also depends on their possessing 
basic psychological and physical wellbeing required 
to function as an effective embodied person in the 
world as it exists (i.e., Gewirth, 1998; Griffin, 2008).  
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Human rights do not exhaust the moral arena and 
only protect the internal and external conditions 
necessary for a minimally worthwhile life. In 
essence, the claim is that the core requirements 
of personhood and agency constitute these basic 
conditions and ought to be vigorously defended by 
the state and its citizens. 
A major ethical strength of a human rights 
perspective is that it acknowledges the essential 
entitlements, and the protection of these core 
interests, of all human beings in the world (Connolly 
& Ward, 2008; Griffin, 2008; Parekh, 2006). While 
people are profoundly shaped by their culture, the 
combination of biologically based needs and shared 
living conditions entails that all human beings have 
certain interests in common. The function of human 
rights is to protect the necessary conditions for a 
minimally worthwhile life. This means ensuring 
that each person has the capabilities to realise their 
goals concerning the kind of life they would like 
to live and possess certain wellbeing goods (e.g., 
education, health care, adequate living conditions, 
freedom from physical pain etc.).  
The conception of human rights presented in this 
paper is sensitive to social and cultural differences. 
The notions of freedom and wellbeing and the 
various goods that constitute them legitimately vary 
according to local conceptions and norms (Wong, 
2006). For example, in one culture, education may 
involve secular, scientific schooling while in another 
it may also involve instruction in traditional cultural 
beliefs and practices. In other words, rights to the 
core values of freedom and wellbeing are shaped 
somewhat by local interpretations of the component 
goods. Of course, common human needs and 
interests derived from a shared human nature 
should also be taken into account when considering 
individuals’ claims for the goods of wellbeing. The 
capabilities necessary to achieve the two conditions 
of freedom and wellbeing are wide-ranging and 
depend on the availability of social and cultural 
resources of one kind or another. There is a danger, 
however, that indigenous peoples’ core interests 
may be overlooked by workers operating with a 
culturally saturated conception of rights-based 
practice. It is a strength of our approach that what 
constitutes the goods of wellbeing and freedom 
(constituents of human dignity) are likely to vary 
from culture to culture. This places considerable 
responsibility on practitioners to make sure they 
understand what specific conceptions of wellbeing 
and freedom are relevant for individuals from 
different cultural groups. 
In line with the above  conception of human rights, 
Dworkin (1970, p.13) argued the importance of 
governments protecting the freedom of its citizens 
based on the familiar idea of political equality:
…weaker members of a political community 
are entitled to the same concern and respect 
of their government as the more powerful 
members have secured for themselves, so that 
if some men [sic] have freedom of decision 
whatever the effect on the general good, then 
all men must have the same freedom. 
Rights are essentially to do with fairness. The 
duty of the government is to support equity, fair 
treatment and other rights necessary to protect a 
person’s human dignity. It must be acknowledged 
that because human rights are simply mechanisms 
for protecting human dignity and the wellbeing and 
freedom components entailed by this fundamental 
moral idea, they can be subverted by political 
groups. One advantage of viewing human rights as 
moral rights is that it becomes possible to criticise 
existing political and social institutions if their 
norms and legalisation fail to reflect the intrinsic 
worth of all people. In other words, human rights 
related legalisation and social norms may in fact 
fail to reflect the moral notions of human dignity. 
It is important to look beyond the rhetoric and ask 
whether the practices justified by human rights ideas 
demonstrate respect for the value of all persons and 
not simply those favoured by virtue of their class, 
gender, age or occupation.
According to Theis (2004, p. 3) the state also has 
a duty to “respect, protect and fulfil rights”. In 
respecting the rights of its citizens, Theis argues 
that state laws, policies, programmes and practices 
should not violate human rights or interfere with the 
individual’s pursuit of their rights. The state should 
also protect rights by preventing rights violation 
by others. In fulfilling rights, the state is expected 
	 11
to take positive action to frame rights in law, policy 
and practice. Whilst the state cannot be expected 
to be responsible for everything, Theis (2004, p. 3) 
argues that the state nevertheless:
…has an obligation to create the conditions 
that enable other duty bearers, such as parents, 
private sector, local organisations, donors 
and international institutions, to fulfil their 
responsibilities. 
This is an inclusive approach to fostering rights-
based initiatives through the formation of duty-
bearer alliances around a common vision and goals. 
That the vast majority of countries have become 
signatories to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCROC) is an indication of the 
commitment that state parties have to the furthering 
of children’s rights. Conventions are treaties 
endorsed by states (or organisations) acting together 
(Veerman, 1992). Unlike declarations, which are not 
considered to be binding documents, conventions 
carry specific obligations, and ratifying implies 
that the state must take active steps to meet those 
expectations. In ratifying a convention, the state 
therefore accepts its obligations. While declarations 
are considered “soft” international law, conventions 
are considered to be “hard” international law. In 
becoming a signatory to UNCROC, therefore, a 
state makes an important commitment to meet its 
expectations under the convention and subjects 
itself to criticism if it does not comply. 
This said, the relationship between law, policy and 
practice in the human services is a complex one. It 
is not always clear how enabling current laws and 
policies are for practitioners wanting to utilise a 
rights-based approach (Williams, 2004).
challEngEs whEn EmbEdding rights-
basEd idEas
There is no question that in recent years a growing 
recognition of rights-based issues has spurred 
governments to develop initiatives that are more 
culturally responsive and meet the particular needs 
of disadvantaged communities. Human service 
systems develop in response to a unique set of 
social and cultural conditions. Because of this, 
responses with respect to law, policy and practice 
can vary considerably. Arguing from a child welfare 
perspective, Hetherington (2002) identifies three 
important factors that influence the functioning of 
service systems: structures, professional ideology 
and culture. 
Structural systems provide the mechanisms 
through which services are delivered. These may be 
organised at a central or regional governmental level 
or they may be provided by local nongovernment 
systems. The structural system influences both the 
way in which interventions occur and the thinking 
behind them. How structural systems fit together 
is also important. For example, in England, the call 
for a “whole-of-government” approach, providing 
more integrated systems of welfare, health and 
education, if successful, will influence the ways in 
which child protection work will evolve as cross-
sectoral relationships develop and are sustained. 
Legal and policy frameworks contribute importantly 
to the structural system and influence levels of state 
intervention. How the law provides for human 
need clearly influences the way in which practice 
is undertaken. For example, the introduction of the 
Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 
(1989) in Aotearoa New Zealand has had the effect of 
changing the ways in which children and families are 
responded to by reinforcing greater family decision-
making and signalling less state intervention into 
family life (Connolly, 1999). Equally, the introduction 
of the Children’s Act (England and Wales) in the same 
year provided a platform for partnership work with 
families. In Australia, the principles of UNCROC 
have influenced the development of new law. For 
example, Victoria’s Children, Youth and Families 
Act 2005 formally recognises child wellbeing as a 
community concern in line with Article 30 of the 
convention (Sheehan 2009). 
At the same time, how human services are 
developed is also influenced by professional 
ideology. Practitioners have theories that guide 
their practice and influence their decision-making. 
Professional ideology shapes practice and influences 
intervention pathways. For example, the adoption 
of a strengths-based perspective has introduced a 
particular flavour to human service practices that 
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has significantly engaged practitioners in recent 
years (Saleebey, 1992). According to Hetherington 
(2002), while organisational structures, resources 
and law provide the influencing environment for 
practice, actual decision-making is nevertheless 
often based on professional knowledge and theory.
Finally, systems are influenced by the culture of the 
society within which they exist. “Culture influences 
and expresses expectations of the various roles 
that should be played by the state, the family, and 
by the community…” (Hetherington, 2002, p.14). 
Child protection is influenced by politically oriented 
cultural drivers that shape not only the thinking but 
the operational application of law and policy. One 
of the inherent limitations of legally dominated 
rights-based thinking is that the most powerful in 
society determine what will be enshrined in law 
and determine the provision and application of 
resources. This is why we consider it so important 
that practitioners develop ethics-based frameworks 
to support practice decision-making (Lonne, Parton, 
Thomson & Harries,2009; Connolly, 2007 and to 
be more nuanced, balanced and mature in their 
thinking about moral and legal rights.  
Human service structures, frameworks and ideology 
can influence the degree to which rights-based ideas 
are embedded in practice. This can be conceptualised 
along a continuum from practice characterised by a 
professional power base to one that reflects a human 
rights based approach (see Figure 1).  
The human rights based model encapsulates the 
notion of client determination within practice. In 
this regard, it is an approach which supports human 
rights and works to negotiate the complexity of 
competing interests and moral claims (Connolly & 
Ward, 2008).  It embraces client decision-making 
and self-determined processes and solutions. Within 
this model, the client is acknowledged as expert in 
understanding their own needs. Respect for cultural 
self-determination and familial interdependencies 
is thus client driven.  Practice transparency is 
important together with solution-focused processes. 
At the other end of the continuum, the professional 
power base model reflects a more traditional 
response to practice. Here we can see elements of 
practice where professionals determine the nature of 
the assessment process, dominate decision-making 
and shape practice solutions. This approach does 
not necessarily ignore rights, but the focus tends to 
be on legalistic and often adversarial interpretations 
of rights and what clients can reasonably claim. 
Missing are the subtleties of rights-based thinking 
and an appreciation of the ways in which a rights-
based analysis can help to negotiate competing 
interests and claims. 
professional 
power base model 
Characterised by: 
professionally determined 
assessment processes, 
professional team decision-
making followed by 
professionally determined 
interventions.
client-infused model
Characterised by: 
professionally determined 
client involvement and/or 
participation in decision- 
making processes. 
Professionally determined 
processes are likely to be at 
the level of consultation..
professionally 
infused model 
Characterised by: 
client-driven processes, but 
with professional involvement 
at critical decision-making 
times. Clients more obviously 
dependent on professional 
help.
human-rights 
based model
Characterised by: 
practice transparency; full 
information access; client 
decision-making at all phases 
of the work.
Practice continuum
Professional power base Human rights base
Oxford University Press. Figure 1. Practice continuum from a professional power base to human rights based 
practicea
a Adapted from M. Connolly and T. Ward,  2008, Morals, rights and practice in the human services: Effective and fair 
decision-making in health, social care and criminal justice , p. 131. Copyright 2008 by Jessica Kingsley Publishers
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In the centre of the continuum we are likely to see 
practice more or less influenced by the two poles. 
While generally more strongly located toward the 
professional power-based practice pole, the client-
infused model nevertheless has elements of client 
involvement, but this is largely determined by the 
professional. Here we are more likely to see the 
professional deciding if, when and how the client 
might be involved in the process. 
The professionally-infused model, while having 
more elements of the purer human rights-based 
approach, nevertheless has greater professional 
involvement at critical decision-making times. It 
can reflect a rights-based orientation in which the 
client clearly influences professional involvement, 
but the emphasis is more strongly on partnership 
rather client empowerment. This is an important 
distinction, the significance of which is reinforced by 
Banks (2006, p. 116) when she discusses the notion 
of “democratic professionalism”: 
Democratic professionalism entails giving 
more power to service users in the context of 
the professional relationship, but the focus 
is on the professional as the one giving the 
power. So although the service user may 
be given more rights and be referred to as a 
‘partner’ … it could be argued that it is still the 
professional that is in control. 
Democratic professionalism can be seen as an 
attempt to become more responsive to client needs 
and interests, ensuring that they have opportunities 
to participate, but nevertheless retaining some 
elements of control. In many respects, it comes 
down to the level of tolerance a system may 
have with respect to positioning along 
the practice continuum. Some will be 
able to tolerate, encourage or mandate 
greater levels of rights-based practice, 
some less. Yet in some ways, regardless 
of what mandate the system provides, 
Banks argues that “while laws, policies 
and procedures can lay the ground rules for 
service users’ rights, they are meaningless if not 
developed alongside the commitment of agencies 
and workers to give support and resources for 
service users to exercise their rights” (2006, p. 117). 
Because practice generally responds to circumstance, 
it would be unlikely for practice to be consistently at 
one point along the continuum or fully up one end 
or the other. Practice is fluid and can shift along the 
continuum over time depending on circumstance 
and levels of reciprocal trust between worker and 
client.
commitmEnt to rights-basEd 
practicE
Practitioners and organisations are likely to 
have differing degrees of commitment to client 
empowerment and client rights of participation 
and self-determination. Influenced by Shier (2001), 
Figure 2 provides a useful way of visualising levels 
of commitment to rights-based ideals. 
At the most basic level of commitment to the ideal 
of client participation, families are consulted and 
their views are taken into account. This requires 
both worker and agency commitment. Is the 
practitioner ready to listen and consult? Does the 
agency support consultation? At the medium level 
of client participation, practice supports client-
based solutions and there is a context in which client 
feedback is sought and acted upon. As with the basic 
level, in order to commit to this kind of practice, 
the worker essentially needs to believe in it. Does 
the practitioner have confidence that clients can be 
Article 2
Basic level: 
families consulted, views 
taken into account
High level: 
Transparent processes; 
family participation in 
decision-making
Medium level:
Support for client-based 
solutions and feedback 
sought on service delivery
• Is the worker prepared to let 
go of professional power?
• Is information access and 
shared decision-making 
possible within the agency?
• Degree of worker 
receptivity?
• Agency capacity and 
commitment to act on 
feedback?
• Worker commitment
• Agency support
Figure 2. Levels of client participation and rights-
based practicea.
a Based on H. Shier, 2001, Pathways to participation: 
Openings, opportunities and obligations. Children and 
Society, 15, 107-117.
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trusted to develop good solutions? Is the worker 
receptive to seeking and acting upon feedback? 
With respect to the agency, is there a commitment 
to support such practice? In many respects, it does 
not really matter how many service-user feedback 
forms are completed; unless the practitioner and the 
agency are receptive, the feedback will not contribute 
constructively to the improvement of services. 
High levels of client participation and commitment 
to rights-based ideals is evidenced by transparent 
processes and greater participation in decision-
making. A higher level of participation marks the 
transition from indirect involvement in decision-
making (consultation, contribution and feedback) to 
direct participation. It reflects a shift in the power 
relationships and the need for professionals to 
examine whether they are able to commit to a set 
of core values that may be at odds with previous 
professional experience. They may need to ask 
themselves whether they are ready to embrace 
client involvement in decision-making. At this 
level, the service design of the organisation—its 
practice frameworks and service model—are seen to 
support practitioner commitment, actively reducing 
structural and ideological barriers that hinder the 
practice application of rights-based ideals.  
In conceptualising these levels of commitment to 
client participation and rights-based ideals, we do 
not want to suggest that these are necessarily linear, 
hierarchical or, indeed, comprehensive. As with our 
earlier continuum discussion (Figure 1), practice 
inevitably fluctuates over time and is subject to 
unique tensions and dilemmas. The distinctions 
between the levels of participation shown in Figure 
2 are both generalised and simplified in order to 
illustrate the way in which practice can be positioned 
over time. 
In conceptualising human rights based practice, we 
have been struck by the range of factors that can 
influence the way a practitioner views the rights of 
clients in the context of service delivery. It is also 
clear to us that the way a worker practises will be 
influenced by the professional system within which 
they work. Service models, frameworks and policies 
can support rights-based approaches to practice. 
Professional cultures can adopt human rights 
theories and values that will influence the way in 
which a professional system and the practitioners 
working within it perceive the rights of the people 
they work with. Human rights that are enshrined 
in legislation can also influence practice, although 
law can inevitably be interpreted in ways that can 
be supportive of rights-based ideals or be subverted 
by competing interests. We believe it is important 
to bring together the elements of practice, policy 
and law in an integrated conceptual framework 
that will provide the broad-ranging reinforcements 
that we consider essential to the embedding and 
maintenance of rights-based practice. 
crEating an intEgratEd framEworK 
to support rights-basEd idEas
When looking to integrate rights-based practice 
ideas, focusing on discrete elements of a human 
service is unlikely to have the kind of impact needed 
to strengthen rights-based practice overall. Focusing 
on practitioners’ views alone, for example, will be 
insufficient to further human rights based practice 
without rights-based ideas being reinforced by 
other elements of the service, such as service design, 
policy and legislation. Nor is it likely that law, policy 
or the practice system alone can provide sufficient 
reinforcement to embed rights-based ideas. To 
successfully integrate these ideas in practice, we 
believe that it is necessary to bring together the 
potential influence of each of these components in 
order to mutually reinforce a coherent vision within 
which rights-based practice will have the chance to 
flourish. 
legislation 
• Enabling and 
supporting rights
• Guiding safe 
practice
worker 
service design
• Rights and 
outcome focused
• Evidence-based
Quality assurance
policy 
• Rights and 
outcome focused
• Evidence-based
• Safe practice 
principled
staff training 
rights-basEd practicE
Primary reinforcers
secondary reinforcers
Figure 3. Reinforcing rights-based ideas.
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There are times when practitioners struggle to 
appreciate the purpose of policies, partly because 
they can be developed as ad hoc responses to 
external pressure. Such developments do not 
always resonate with the way practitioners view and 
experience the world in which they work. Indeed, 
some policies are perceived to be obstacles to good 
practice; in the way they have been interpreted, they 
may actually be so. Conversely, policy analysts and 
legal professionals may be concerned about the way 
in which practice can evolve in the absence of clear 
policy guidelines and/or research evidence of what 
works well. 
We contend that applying a coherent human rights 
perspective to service design, policy development 
and legislative review as opportunities occur has 
the potential to strongly influence good client 
outcomes. In our view, the more focused the 
practitioner on human rights, the more likely it is 
that an environment will be created which fosters 
positive change. We therefore see a focus on rights-
based ideas, including those that impact on the 
relationship between clients and practitioners, 
as central to achieving good outcomes: “meeting 
their different self-defined needs in the way they, 
ensured full knowledge, support and choice, prefer” 
(Beresford, cited in Smith, 2005, p.102). 
Human beings have the right to realise their full 
potential and to experience the best outcomes that 
they can for themselves and their families. Linking 
human rights to outcomes encourages practitioners 
to think about how practice influences the people 
they work with in the longer term and how nurturing 
human agency has the potential to support good 
outcomes. This means that practitioners need to 
support and, at times, scaffold people’s agency 
efforts to live a “good life” in accordance with their 
cherished goals and values and, in doing so, become 
healthy and thriving members of a society in which 
they feel valued and connected. Building practice 
frameworks that are rights-based and outcome-
focused (Connolly, 2007; Ward & Connolly, 2008) 
will reinforce practice behaviours that are consistent 
with a rights-based perspective. When policy and 
guidelines are developed or reviewed, this provides 
an opportunity to embed relevant human rights-
based principles, such as inclusion and participation, 
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in practice fields that will further reinforce human 
rights-based practice. Finally, when a revision of 
the relevant legislation occurs, the human rights 
principles in international treaties, such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child or the 
United Nations Conventions on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, need to be incorporated into the 
legislation of those countries that have ratified the 
particular treaty. The inclusion of specific human 
rights in the relevant legislation will reinforce the 
importance of rights-based practice as practitioners 
work with clients, and it will also influence the 
development of policies and guidelines.  
If we conceptualise these three elements (service 
design, policy and statutory provision) as key 
factors that influence practice and  all three reflect 
rights-based ideas in an integrated way, they will 
mutually reinforce rights-based practice. As such, 
they are primary reinforcers (see Figure 3). 
A strategy that involves developing systems that 
mutually reinforce critical ideas will be more likely 
to have the depth of influence required to shift 
practitioners toward human rights based practice 
and ensure its endurance over time. However, these 
are not the only important reinforcers. As practice 
develops around a coherent set of rights-based 
ideas, it becomes important to reinforce this through 
other systemic processes, such as supervision, 
quality assurance/improvement and training. These 
secondary reinforcers can also play a critical role 
when marshalled toward a collective rights-based 
vision and purpose. 
conclusions
Rights-based approaches are concerned with 
everyone’s rights. They do not privilege one person’s 
rights over another—for example, a parent’s rights 
over their children’s rights. In our view, human 
rights are ethical scaffolds that connect the different 
strands of human life in ways that respect the integrity 
of persons and the need for social justice. Rights 
are protective capsules that function to safeguard 
the essential conditions for agency, freedom and 
wellbeing. They are constructs that can exist only in 
supportive political, social and personal networks 
where human dignity is valued and the life of each 
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individual is treasured. Human rights remind 
us that we all require scaffolding by the efforts of 
others at one time or another in our lives and that 
an effective way to create a healthy community is to 
attend to the needs of the individuals that comprise 
it. Rights-based practice is simply another entrance 
into a world where the interests of clients are viewed 
as pivotal and the task of practitioners is to help 
them to create a space where their lives can be lived 
in ways that reflect both their deep commitments 
and momentary concerns. 
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